As per usual the below is just my personal opinion NOT AN ADVICE. If anything, if you read this and think the reasoning is rubbish, please save me some money by telling me. Thanks!
Sometimes a great business is a bad investment usually when it’s so expensive that economically it can’t work for shareholders if we accept that intrinsic value of a business is the sum of all cashflows into infinity correctly discounted. For infinity read say 50 years… Consider Cisco in 2000:
The flipside of great business/bad investment is bad business/great investment. Does it exist? It’s likely the cigar-butt of Graham/Buffet fame. Here we may have another example - Zytronic Plc. Other people have covered it in more detail and provided good reasons to buy it - eg: Alex Stuart - Zytronic Plc. At this stage I think it’s largely irrelevant what the company does given the position it’s in.
Cigar-butts only work in aggregate not individually - Graham/Schloss had many securities in their portfolios to make the strategy work. On an individual basis it’s basically a speculation. As such I want to think about what could happen and what’s the likely outcome for the bet/investment. Here is where we are:
Pros:
Selling way below book (£13m book but market cap £6m)
Lots of cash for now (£3.7m as of March ‘24) - but burning through it fairly quickly
Lots of possibly valuable property - perhaps to the tune of £10m if revalued to today’s prices
IP - patents - probably depreciating fairly quickly
Still selling quite a bit with a decent pipeline - although this was revised down recently
Decent management - seems they are not trying to hide things and deal with the problems. They are also paying themselves reasonable salaries. CEO owns about 1% of the stock.
Cons:
Super-long lead times to sales. They were really clobbered by Covid and lost a lot of sales for four years now. If the lead times are 1-2 years it would take them at least the same time to go back to the previous sales perhaps more or never as the technology and competition might have moved on. If they regain profitability in the next one to two years it's unlikely they will run out of money (they burnt through almost 2mil last year) but beyond that survival is really questionable.
Management is reviewing business with a facilitator - I appreciate they want outside perspective but the consultant is likely incentivised to recommend to continue operations - but perhaps the best case would be a sale or liquidation?
Customer concentration - in the last call they mentioned the big ones are involved on multiple projects so perhaps not so bad but still a biggish risk?
In summary it used to be a nice cash generative business without much prospect for growth (with decent management) when it worked and here is what could happen:
If they regain profitability (say £1-2m PBT) it could be worth in the region of £20-30m which is a considerable upside on today’s £6m. I'm giving this a probability of less than 50% say 30% - turnarounds are hard but not impossible.
If they fail quickly - let's say they run out of money in two years or less and liquidate or sell - it's worth at least the £10 mil in property - I'd say the probability of that is low - maybe 10%. Sunk cost bias, endowment effect etc perhaps in play - management will want to continue operations due to loyalty. Also in a liquidation, the assets are likely to largely disappear to various groups like the employees, lawyers etc. Let’s say the value at that point is as is today. Would shareholders push them to sell? Maybe.
If they fail slowly - say over five years, sales don't improve, CEO leaves, they get into debt, mortgage the property and generally run it into the ground, let's say the probability is 60% of that happening. Inertia is a horrible thing and hope springs eternal - usually people will be happy to deceive themselves that just one quarter more and the results will improve etc, then they do a bit (by just reversal to the mean), then they crash again etc etc. Again, depends on the board and shareholders to push for a solution that doesn’t destroy shareholder value.
Then, if I bet/invest 100:
It’s a positive expected value bet even under these conditions. I'm ignoring the discount rate and assuming the above happens in say two years. Also, note that in the slow fail scenario I’m assuming final value of 30 - that’s because I think I can set a stop loss at that level.
Sidecar investment?
As per Zeckhauser (Munger says you should basically invest as Zeckhauser plays bridge) Zeckhauser - Investing in unknown and unknowable you can take advantage of confidence others have in an investment. There are number of activist investors who bought into the business. Could they pressure management into selling/liquidating?
The above is necessarily simplified ad-absurdum, there are number of ways this could play out, eg some clever restructuring, management change, partial sell, heavy risky bet on some internal product development that pays off but I think the above scenarios are broadly the way it could go.
Please let me know what what am I missing. Thanks!
Having investigated this a while back, I took a pass because I believed there were just too many moving parts to make an accurate judgement on either future direction or mispricing. Find some of my notes below.
My main impressions/reservations were:
(1) clear multi-year headwinds in revenue streams – especially their cash cow segments ATMs and gaming – with ATMs coming to an end;
(2) poor cost management despite obvious operating leverage and negative revenue trends (CEO has a history in engineering & sales);
(3) disruption in the smaller touch screen segment (biggest market) by competitors that can deliver higher volumes faster (e.g. automotive, airlines, ...). I assumed a lot of their IP should be valued at zero as a result of this;
(4) the European POS industry as a whole has been under pressure the last 4-5 years which management somehow failed to notice;
(5) limited value for an acquirer within the industry (assuming worthless IP and limited repeat business moving forward);
Some other notes:
* AURES Technologies (AULAR.PA) – is a French POS manufacturer (micro cap) which went through a similar environment and operating leverage as Zytronics leading to heavy losses. It recently got acquired making it a 2x for those that managed to buy the trough.
* Zytronics grew out of a safety glass manufacturer. I believe their main product differentiator has historically been the durability of their touchscreens, which was driving repeat business in ATMs and gaming. In light of this, I believe their attempts at differentiation and IP didn't add much value.
* Management stated in one of their reports since the pandemic that they believed their ATM revenue would come to an end after losing a big repeat customer. They also shared that all ATM revenue moving forward is coming from ATM maintenance – not new machines. They also observed a secular trend in end customers preferring to purchase OEM ATM machines with shorter order cycles, rather than custom-built ATM machines (their customers).
From https://data.fca.org.uk/artefacts/NSM/RNS/5390658.html:
“The Company is today announcing its intention to undertake a strategic review (the "Strategic Review"), in conjunction with shareholders, to assess the future options for the Company, which are:
1. the implementation of a new strategic business plan ("Transformation Plan");
2. an orderly solvent liquidation of the Company's assets;
3. the potential sale of the Company;
4. delisting and continuing as a private company, either:
a. continuing with the business as currently undertaken but without the considerable costs associated with maintaining the Company's admission to trading on AIM, or
b. implementing the Transformation Plan; or
5. selling the Company's assets and continuing as a cash shell.”
Of the above Nr.1 would fall into my “Recovery” scenario above. I now think the probability of that is perhaps 5%. If option 1 gets adopted the probability of its success is low. If we assume that the final value of this scenario is 400 and probability is 5% then the expected value of this scenario is 15.
Options 2 and 3 fall into the Quick Fail scenario – wind-down or sale. Now the market cap of the business is around £5m and they still have some cash ~ £3.7m. They have the approx. £10m in real estate and I’d assume most of the cash will disappear by the time of a sale/liquidation so it’s worth perhaps 200 in final value so expected value of 35 if we assume the probability of this scenario is 35%.
The Slow Fail scenario is still the most likely in my view ~ 60%. It includes the options 1 and transformation plan failing and options 4 and 5. I suspect the management will push for the transformation plan for their own sake and their workforce. Although there are several deep value investors invested (perhaps 30% of ownership) in the business what are the chances of them getting their way? If we accept that the probability is 60% and final value perhaps 30 then the expected value is still -42.
Overall expect value dropped to 8 (15 + 35 - 42). I don’t have any shares now, will I buy them now? No. If I had shares would I sell them now? Probably not.